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China’s economic miracle has become a cliché. The figures bear out the 
country’s amazing economic development. Its economy has maintained 9 
per cent annual growth for almost three decades. It has overtaken the 
United States as the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, 
with an inflow of something like $500 billion by 2004. It has taken more 
than 300 million people out of absolute poverty in a period of less than 
two decades, an achievement unprecedented in human history. 
 
There are now more than 100 million middle-class Chinese and the 
number is growing, says the Los Angeles Times. The total number of 
internet users is already the second in the world, nearing 100 million. 
According to one estimate, during the early 1990s three-quarters of the 
world’s construction cranes were in China, and a quarter of them were in 
Shanghai alone. Indeed, if one takes a trip to Guangdong, a province that 
has a population larger than that of the United Kingdom, one can see that 
the whole province has been a construction site, “the contemporary 
equivalent of the 19th century Manchester, a workshop of the world,” 
according to the Economist. China produces 50 per cent of the world’s 
cameras, 30 per cent of its air conditioners, and 25 per cent of its washing 
machines. 
 
Or, if you want yet more figures: 15 per cent of the world’s economic 
growth and nearly 60 per cent of its export growth in 2002 came from 
China. Measured in purchasing power parity, China’s gross domestic 
product already ranks the second in the world. China will be as big a 
force as the economies of the European Union put together within the 
next four to five years. And so on, and so forth.  
 
However, beneath these hyperboles there lies a grimy reality that often 
escapes media attention. China is a country in which 70 per cent of the 
population are still rural and, by Western standards, live in poverty. For at 
least the past two decades there have been 100 million to 150 million 
rural-to-urban migrants who are either looking for work or working in 
sweat shops. The average wages of these migrant workers have remained 
the same since the 1990s: $50 to $70 a month. That is China at its worst. 
But even for the other China, the better-off urban China, the average 
income per head of the officially registered 480 million urban residents 
was just $830 in 2001. 
 
Health care has fallen shockingly behind what it was in pre-development 
years. Even official spokesmen now admit that more than half of the rural 
population have not got the money to see a doctor when they are ill, even 
when there happens to be a doctor around. Increasingly, more and more 
urban residents have begun to fall into this category too, as more and 
more workers lose their jobs: there may be as many as 15 million 
unemployed in the towns, and ten times that number in the countryside. I 
ADDED THOSE FIGURES. ARE THEY OK? (That is OK and may be 
an underestimate) 
 
The polarisation of China, and the dispossession of the poor, is so sharp 
that China’s leaders themselves repeatedly give warning of the kind of 
social unrest that could put the regime in danger. This danger can be 
measured by the Gini coefficient, which is used widely by economists to 
gauge whether wealth is distributed fairly within a country. According to 
officially released Gini figures, the disparity in wealth is steadily 
growing, and has been greatly underestimated. 
 
In the post-Mao era, ever since Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978, the 
central government has invested enormous amounts in such coastal cities 
as Shanghai and Shenzhen, and has created favourable conditions, in 
terms of infrastructure and tax concessions, for foreign companies to 
operate. As part of this investment, rural China was taxed. In return, the 
central government has spent little on rural education or health care. 
Local governments at county, township and village levels owe huge 
amount of debts. The whole rural bureaucracy is bankrupt. 
 
According to Li Changping, a former Communist Party secretary of a 
township, who in 2002 wrote a celebrated letter to the then Chinese 
premier, Zhu Rongji, and subsequently published a book on the plight of 
people in the countryside, the debt in the township where he worked 
amounted to 1,000 Chinese yuan ($85) per head in 1999. An estimate 
released in Beijing recently suggests that the total debt owed by county, 
township and village governments amounts to about 800 yuan for every 
rural resident. And that figure is certainly an underestimate, 
 
How do local governments find the money to pay their teachers as well as 
paying the interest on these debts (interest which is sometimes as high as 
30 per cent, and is very often gathered by debt collectors who are the 
party and government officials themselves)? Moreover, money has to be 
found for local bureaucratic extravaganza, such as banquets and cars and 
office buildings, for fancy projects that advertise the country’s economic 
advance. The answer is levies and taxes on the peasants, which in some 
places amount to more than 100 different kinds of tax. Not only is there a 
tax on slaughtering, even when you do not have a pig to kill, but there is 
also a tax on family planning. Families may be fined by local officials if 
they have more pregnancies than allowed, and rural women are brutally 
forced (sometimes kidnapped) to have an abortion. IS THIS EDITING 
CORRECT (yes except it does not seem to say to the reader that the rural 
people are paying for the cost of getting themselves operated 
forcefully)?? Many rural families manage to pay the various taxes only 
because their teenage children, working thousands of miles away, have 
saved money to send home. Thus farming and rural taxes are paid by 
migrants working their hearts out in the coastal cities.  
 
Have we in the West not noticed that the prices of consumer goods in the 
shops, such as shoes and electrical appliances, are getting cheaper and 
cheaper, while the prices of industrial goods, ranging from iron ore, 
copper and zinc to timer and cement, have skyrocketed in recent years? 
This non sequitur springs from a combination of three factors: cheap 
Chinese labour, tax concessions granted by the Chinese government, and 
labour/environmental conditions that are virtually unregulated. Expensive 
raw commodities are shipped to China for foreign firms to produce cheap 
products.  
 
The coolie labour comes from rural Chinese migrants. City-born Chinese, 
even the unemployed, would not want to work in these sweat shops. And 
migrant workers are not allowed jobs that urban residents are willing to 
do. An average migrant worker slaves 14 to 16 hours a day for seven days 
a week to earn about $70 a month, from which they have to pay for their 
lodging and food. 
 
On top of that they have to pay for temporary resident fees, identity cards 
(which they have to carry with them all the time), registration fees or 
whatever fees a city government fancies. They are also charged higher 
rates for basic public services. For instance, in some cities a migrant 
worker has to pay more than a city resident for a monthly bus pass. Even 
postal delivery can be more expensive for a migrant. It would cause 
outrage if this happened to a foreigner in any Western country. But it is 
accepted as normal when Chinese citizens, who are considered non-
residents of a town, are given this kind of apartheid treatment. 
 
How can it be that a country run by a Communist Party whose raison 
d’etre is to bring about equality in human society, and whose political 
manifesto is to bring privileges to the working class, has become one of 
the most exploitative and unequal countries on earth? The question can be 
answered by looking briefly at three salient features of today’s China. 
 
The first is the ideology of development, development, development. 
Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “development as the core value” (fa zhan shi 
ying dao li) has become the guiding principle for policy-makers. 
Economic growth is the key performance-indicator for Chinese officials 
climbing the career ladder. To catch up with the developed West is the 
goal, no matter what. No matter, for instance, the environmental 
degradation. Ten of the world’s most polluted cities are in China. 
Deforestation, desertification, undrinkable water, you name it (see page 
xx). Anyone who is worried about environmental problems in the United 
Kingdom, should go and have a look at China. It is already a human 
disaster of unprecedented scale.  
 
The development push has political advantages. It satisfies Chinese 
nationalists who have long believed that a backward China needs to catch 
up fast. It also keeps orthodox Chinese Communists quiet since it is 
Marxist doctrine that the advancement of production is the ultimate basis 
and force for human progress. Finally (and this is expounded on below), 
the belief that development requires the rule of the market economy has 
become a religion for elite Chinese economic liberals. 
 
That is the second salient feature of today’s China: the increasing 
influence of neo-liberalism in policy-making. This neo-liberalism dictates 
that China, in order to catch up with development, has to go through a 
primitive capital-accumulation process similar to the process of British 
industrialisation. Profits have to be made at somebody’s cost. And the 
somebodies, in this case, are the rural poor, who have to shed sweat and 
blood to develop China. Only when the burden of China’s benighted 
peasantry is thrown into the rubbish bin of history, will China be modern 
like the West. A Chinese commentator calls this economic policy the 
Europeanisation of coastal, urban China, and the Africanisation of the 
rural heartland. 
 
Perhaps an illustration of this way of thought is the building of the super-
speed Maglev (magnetic levitation) railway, a $1.2 billion development 
toy that Zhu Rongji wanted in order to demonstrate China’s modernity. 
The Maglev train has a normal speed of 430 kilometres an hour, but it 
still takes 18 minutes to travel the 30 kilometres from Shanghai city to its 
Pudong airport because, as soon as the train gathers speed, it has to 
reduce speed to stop. 
 
The third feature is the expansion of what I call the comprador class (a 
nineteenth-century term that referred to the Chinese chief agent of a 
foreign business-house). The people now in charge of the country, 
whether they are the friends and relations of Deng Xiaoping, Zhu Rongji 
or Jiang Zemin (the general-secretary of the Communist Party until three 
years ago) or party and government officials at every level, are the direct 
beneficiaries of China’s no-holds-barred development policy. When 
foreigners do business with or in China, such people are either their 
partners or their intermediaries. When dispossession takes place, such as 
land enclosure, or when state assets are sold, they are the beneficiaries. 
When huge infrastructure projects, such as the three Gorges Dams, are 
planned, they have first (and sometimes the only) access to contracts. 
 
Many of the comprador class have studied in Western countries, and 
more are being sent there (Britain is one of the countries to benefit). They 
have bank accounts and properties in the West. Their mentality, their life 
style and their very existence depend on compradoring China. China is 
the workshop of the world, owned by foreigners but managed by Chinese 
compradors. Kodak dominates the photographing industry, Coca-Cola the 
beverage industry, Japanese, German and American companies the 
motor-vehicle industry, and so on. 
 
These three features of Chinese life may help to explain why the disparity 
between urban and rural China, between the rich and poor, seems to have 
become part of the rationale of the country’s development. Perhaps they 
also explain why a bestselling book “An Investigative Report on the 
Chinese Peasantry” (Zhongguo nongmin diaocha) which details the 
misery of the countryside, was banned in China, and why the authors, a 
husband and wife team called Chen Guidi and Chun Tao, were brought to 
court by one of the officials described in the book. The court case 
continues, and the jury is out. 
 
